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This paper uses an overlapping generations framework to analyze the implications of different 
financing regimes in the education sector for human capital formation and economic welfare. 
Agents privately invest in education after they have received a noisy information signal about 
their abilities. The incentives of the individuals to invest in education are determined by the 
financing regime under which the economy operates. The paper analyzes and compares three 
financing regimes. Under each regime, the payback obligation of an educational loan is 
contingent, to some extent, on an individual’s future income. 
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Ample empirical evidence shows that higher education is an important element in
generating personal incomes and in promoting the economic performance of coun-
tries [see, Barro (1998), Bassinini and Scarpenta (2001), Restuccia and Urrutia
(2004). Consistent with this ﬁnding, investment in the education sectors of the
OECD countries has increased substantially during the second half of the twenti-
eth century [Greenaway and Haynes (2003), Checchi (2006)]. Yet, the expansion
of higher education has often collided with ﬁscal pressures, thereby creating a ten-
dency to shift the ﬁnancial burden of an expanding education sector away from
public funding towards private funding.1 In particular, some European countries
have recently substituted various forms of income support transfers with programs
based on student loans. On balance, this process has resulted in a signiﬁcant decline
of public funding per student.
The shift towards private funding of higher education is sometimes justiﬁed
with reference to an egalitarian income distribution. On average, students have a
better socio-economic background and, hence, higher income prospects than other
members of society. Therefore, public subsidies of higher education constitute an
implicit monetary transfer from the poor towards the more aﬄuent individuals.
This problematic aspect of public funding has been pointed out by Friedman in his
famous contribution on Capitalism and Freedom in 1962.
In addition, as long as frictionless ﬁnancial markets (for private education ﬁ-
nancing) exist, individual abilities will be used eﬃciently in the production process
under a private funding scheme. In reality, however, ﬁnancial markets for education
ﬁnancing are imperfect and sometimes even non-existent. Young individuals often
cannot provide suﬃcient collateral which would allow them to borrow against their
future incomes. Therefore, a structural change away from public funding towards
private funding requires the provision of suitable loan programs which remove ﬁnan-
cial barriers for the young generation to participate in the higher education system.
Ideally, such loan programs would also provide some diversiﬁcation of individual
1Even in Russia 47% of the students in the higher education system must ﬁnance their tuition
fees (which are signiﬁcant), as well as other related costs from their own resources [see Kaganovich
(2005)].
1income risks within a given cohort of agents.
Thus, moving from public funding towards private funding of higher education
generally induces a trade-oﬀ in terms of economic welfare which results from in-
teracting eﬃciency eﬀects and equity eﬀects. What are the main ingredients of
a ﬁnancing scheme which optimally combines the eﬃciency and equity eﬀects in
light of this trade-oﬀ? Friedman (1955,1962) was the ﬁrst to raise this issue and
to suggest income-contingent ﬁnancing of students’ investments in higher educa-
tion.2 Friedman argues that the use of income-contingent loans for the ﬁnance of
higher education is recommendable because it allows individuals to sell ‘shares’ in
their random future income streams in order to ﬁnance their educational invest-
ments. These shares will be bought by investors who can ‘diversify’ their holdings
through buying shares from many diﬀerent agents with independent3 income risks.
The diversiﬁcation process drives down the expected return on the shares to the
market rate of interest. This mechanism ensures that individuals can ﬁnance their
educational investments on favorable terms, thereby avoiding an economy-wide un-
derinvestment in education.
Friedman’s suggestion is not explicit about the precise way in which the repay-
ment should be linked to individual income. In particular, it is not clear whether
all students should be oﬀered the same terms of repayment or whether these terms
might take into account certain individual characteristics which are correlated to an
agent’s future earning prospects. In this paper we reconsider this issue. Our aim is
to analyze the implications of alternative income-contingent ﬁnancing schemes for
higher education diﬀering mainly in the degree of risk pooling that they involve.
The Friedman-argument suggests that the overall investment process in an edu-
cation sector with income-contingent loans ﬁnance is more eﬃcient, if individual
income risks are pooled more comprehensively. Our analysis shows that, in general,
2More recently, various forms of integrating income-sensitive elements into ﬁnancing schemes
for higher education have been discussed in Barr and Crawford (1988) and in Greenaway and
Haynes (2003). The design of student loan programs, repayment and debt default, as well as some
international experience has been discussed by Woodhall (1988) and Lleras (2004). Albrecht and
Ziderman (1993) provide evidence on loans collectibility and on the cost of such programs.
3More precisely, Friedman (1955) is talking about individual incomes that are subject to risks
which can be completely eliminated by pooling. This property is not always equivalent to assuming
that individual income risks are independent.
2this conjecture is not true. In fact, the process which transforms aggregate invest-
ment in education into aggregate human capital can be improved by restricting risk
pooling to certain subgroups of agents.
We conduct our analysis in the framework of an overlapping generations model
with endogenous human capital formation. Models of this type were used, for
example, by Azariadis and Drazen (1990), Orazem and Tesfatsion (1997), Viaene
and Zilcha (2002). Individuals are randomly endowed with innate abilities. When
young, the agents learn an imperfect signal of their ability (or future income), and
then chose their investment in education.
We distinguish between three ﬁnancing regimes which specify the terms of re-
payment for education loans. Under the ﬁrst regime, the government guarantees
students unrestricted access to competitive credit markets. The government also
guarantees enforcement of debt collection. The second regime links the repayment
of a loan to an agent’s future income in a way which allows risk pooling across all
members in the same generation. The third regime also links the terms of repay-
ment to future income, but in a ‘narrower’ sense which supports pooling of income
risks only among individuals in the same signal group. The second regime cannot be
decentralized in a competitive ﬁnancial market setting, and it has major drawbacks
with regard to the eﬃciency of the human capital formation process. Therefore,
this regime serves mainly as a standard of comparison for the other two regimes.
As a main result we ﬁnd that a repayment scheme that allows pooling of income
risks within signal groups (third regime) stimulates investment in education and
economic growth compared with a funding scheme of competitive credit markets
(ﬁrst regime). The intuition for this result is rather straightforward: in each signal
class under the third regime, agents’ residual risks are insured which leads them to
invest more. Also, the third regime generates higher welfare than the ﬁrst regime.
Under the third regime economic growth is higher than under the second regime,
even though aggregate investment in education may be lower. The welfare com-
parison between the second and the third ﬁnancing regimes can be characterized in
terms of technological and preference parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model and the above men-
tioned three ﬁnancing regimes in Section 2. Section 3 examines the implications of
3these ﬁnancing schemes for investment in education and human capital accumula-
tion. Section 4 compares the welfare implications of these funding schemes. Section
5 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping-generations economy with a single commodity, say,
physical capital, which can be consumed or invested in production. Individuals
live for three periods: the ‘youth period’, where each individual is supported by
parents. In this period, the agent takes out a loan and makes a capital investment
in education in order to acquire skills; the ‘middle period’, where individuals work,
earn labor income, consume and save. Labor income depends on each agent’s skills,
or human capital, which is assumed to be observable. Part of the labor income is
earmarked for the repayment of the loan. Finally, the ‘retirement period’ in which
individuals consume their total savings. There is no population growth and each
generation Gt (i.e., all individuals born at date t − 1), t = 0,1,2... , consists of a
continuum of agents with (Lebesgue-) measure 1, say the interval [0,1].
Our framework is characterized by heterogenous individuals in each generation,
where heterogeneity is generated by random innate ability. While nature assigns
abilities to individuals at birth, no individual knows exactly his own ability when,
at young age, he invests privately in education. Therefore, the investment decision,
x, is made under uncertainty. In the next period, the agent learns his ability A. We
denote by ν(A) the time-invariant density of agents with ability A, where A ∈ A for
some closed interval A ⊂ R++. From the perspective of a young individual, ability
is random as it is the realization of a random variable with distribution ν( ). Yet,
there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy, i.e., the ex post distribution of
abilities across the members of a generation is exactly ν. Our modeling approach
follows the technique suggested in Feldman and Gilles [1985, Proposition 2], where
uncertainty exists at the individual level but in the aggregate there is no uncertainty.
The production function of human capital is, in general, a complex function
which depends on individual, family, and other parameters. We shall restrict the
structure of the human capital formation process, in order to make our equilibrium
4comparative dynamics analytically manageable. We assume that the level of human
capital, or skills, of an individual i ∈ Gt, denoted by hi
t, depends on the (random)
innate ability Ai, the private investment in education xi ∈ R+, and the average
human capital of the older generation, denoted by Ht−1 (which may represent the





Public investment in individual education, which is assumed to be the same
for all agents, is included in the accumulation function, g, through some implicit
additive component. We make the following assumption about this process:
Assumption 1 g(x,H) is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and concave in
the ﬁrst argument, and satisﬁes limx→0 g′
1(x,H) = ∞ for H > 0. Also g′
1(x,H) is






is non-increasing in x, i.e., K′
1(x,H) ≤ 0 ∀x,H.
K(x,H) is a measure of concavity (with respect to x) of the accumulation func-
tion g. By Assumption 1, this measure of concavity is decreasing in x which implies
that g′
1(x,H) is convex in x. Thus, the marginal product of investment in educa-
tion decreases at a declining rate. This restriction is satisﬁed by most functional
forms commonly used in the literature to describe the transformation of educational
investment into human capital formation.
Each agent chooses private investment in education after he has learned a pub-
licly observable signal y ∈ Y ⊂ R of his ability A. Students receive such signals
before they enter higher education. Examples include personality tests and matric-
ulation examinations used by universities to screen the ﬁeld of applicants. The test
results are noisy but they are correlated with the characteristics that have been
tested.
Within the group of agents with ability A, the signals are distributed according
to the density νA(y). The signal assigned to an agent can be used as a screening
5device for his unknown ability. Based on the screening information conveyed by
the signal, the agent forms expectations about his ability in a Bayesian way. The
distribution of signals received by agents in the same generation has the density
µ(y) =
 
A νA(y)ν(A)dA. Average ability of all agents who have received the sig-
nal y is ¯ Ay := E
  ˜ A




A Aνy(A)dA, where νy(A) denotes the density of the
conditional distribution of A given the signal y.
In our model both the signals and the investments made by individuals in their
education are publicly observable. We assume throughout the paper that the Mono-
tone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) holds, i.e., the signals are ordered in such
a way that y′ > y implies that the posterior distribution of ability conditional on y′
dominates the posterior distribution of ability conditional on y in the ﬁrst-degree
stochastic dominance. In this sense, higher signals are ‘good news’ [see, Milgrom
(1981)].
Each young individual needs a loan in order to ﬁnance his investment in edu-
cation. The terms of repayment are subject to government intervention. We shall
consider three diﬀerent forms of government intervention in the market for educa-
tion loans:
1. Regime I (Unrestricted Access to Credit Markets): Under this regime the gov-
ernment guarantees each student unrestricted access to credit markets for
funds needed to ﬁnance higher education. The government also guarantees
enforcement of debt collection, e.g., through levies on wages.
2. Regime II (Unrestricted Insurance of Loans): Under this regime the terms of
repayment of a loan are linked to the realization of an individual’s future in-
come (hence, linked to the realization of his human capital). This insurance
arrangement pools the risks of all young agents in the same cohort who choose
to invest in education. The governmental intervention includes releasing in-
formation about individual incomes, as well as guaranteeing the collection of
debt.
3. Regime III (Restricted Insurance of Loans): Again, the terms of repayment
are linked to random individual future incomes. Yet, the insurance arrange-
ment pools the risks within each signal group (group of agents who have
6received the same signal) separately.
We shall study these three ﬁnancing regimes separately, assuming that the same
regime applies to all agents. Thus, in our economy only one regime prevails; in
particular, students cannot choose between a loan in the credit market with un-
contingent terms of repayment (Regime I) and a loan with contingent repayment
(Regimes II or III). This assumption seems reasonable because the implementation
of any regime requires some government intervention.4 Hence, the regimes do not
emerge, and compete against each other, endogenously. Rather, they should be
viewed as political choice variables. The implications of those political choice vari-
ables for the time path of aggregate human capital and welfare will be analyzed
below.
Regime II serves as a benchmark in our analysis. In some European countries
like Germany funding concepts for higher education in the spirit of Regime II have
been discussed in the 70s. While this regime may have some appeal from the
viewpoint of an egalitarian income distribution, it has major drawbacks in terms of
ineﬃciencies for the human capital formation process. In addition, Regime II must
be enforced by the state; it cannot be sustained as a market equilibrium because
banks would ask to see peoples’ signals and oﬀer individuals with high signals loans
on better terms than individuals with low signals. Therefore, in this paper we treat
Regime II mainly as a standard of comparison for the other two regimes.
The agents are expected utility maximizers with von-Neumann Morgenstern
lifetime utility function
U(c1,c2) = u1(c1) + u2(c2).
c1 and c2 denote consumption in the second and third period of life, respectively.
In his ﬁrst period of life each agent makes a capital investment in education, but
he does not consume. The utility functions ui : R+ → R, i = 1,2, are strictly
increasing and strictly concave.
In each period, competitive ﬁrms produce a commodity that can be used for con-
sumption. The ﬁrms use physical capital, K, and human capital, H, as production
4This holds true even for Regime I. Given the evidence about borrowing constraints that
students face in the ﬁnancial markets (see, e.g., Galor and Zeira (1993)), some intervention by the
government is needed to implement the regime.
7factors. Physical capital fully depreciates in the production process. We describe
the production process by an aggregate production function F(K,H), which ex-
hibits constant returns to scale. In his ‘working period’ each agent i inelastically
supplies l units of labor and, hence, his supply of human capital is lhi. Without loss
of generality, we set l = 1. The production function has the following properties:
Assumption 2 F(K,H) is concave, homogeneous of degree 1, and satisﬁes FK >
0, FH > 0,FKK < 0,FHH < 0.
Physical capital is internationally mobile while human capital is assumed to be
immobile.5 This implies that the interest rate, ¯ rt, is exogenously given at each date
(small country assumption). Having assumed full depreciation of physical capital in
each period, marginal productivity of aggregate physical capital, Kt equals 1 + ¯ rt.
Thus, given the aggregate stock of human capital at date t, Ht, the stock of physical
capital, Kt, adjusts such that
Rt := 1 + ¯ rt = FK(Kt,Ht) t = 1,2,3,   
is satisﬁed. This implies by Assumption 1, that Kt/Ht is determined by the in-
ternational rate of interest ¯ rt. Hence the wage rate (price of one unit of human
capital), wt = FL(Kt/Ht,1), is also determined once ¯ rt is given.
2.1 Financing Regime I
Let us consider the decision problem that each i ∈ Gt faces under Regime I, given
¯ rt,wt, and Ht−1. At date t − 1, when ‘young’, this individual chooses investment
in education, xi, while his ability is still unknown. The investment decision will be
based on the noisy information about the agent’s ability that is conveyed by the
signal yi. The investment, xi, is ﬁnanced through a standard loan contract which
is signed at date t−1, and which involves the obligation to pay back Rtxi in period
t.
5This assumption is in line with some implications of the globalization process that we have
witnessed in recent decades. While globalization has increased the international mobility of phys-
ical capital tremendously, movements of labor across international borders are still the exception
rather than the rule.
8An optimal decision is taken in two consecutive steps. At date t − 1, after
the signal yi has been observed, our agent i ∈ Gt chooses an optimal level of
investment in education, xi, and signs the associated loan contract. When choosing
the investment level, the agent perceives his ability to be randomly distributed
according to νyi( ). Optimal savings, si, are chosen at date t after ability, Ai,
has been observed. At this time, xi (which has been chosen at date t − 1) is
predetermined.
For given levels of hi,xi,wt,Rt, and Rt+1 the optimal consumption and saving
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1 = wt˜ h
i − Rtx




2 = Rt+1˜ s
i, (8)
where ˜ hi is given by equation (1) and ˜ si satisﬁes equation (5). By the Envelope
theorem and the strict concavity of the utility functions, this optimization problem


















9At date t − 1, the members of Gt diﬀer only by the signals they have received.
Therefore, all individuals in the same signal group, Gt(y), choose the same invest-
ment level, denoted xt(y).6 The net income (gross income net of repayment of the































, respectively. From (5) we derive s′
t(It) ∈ (0,1). Equations (3) and (4)
then imply c1′
t (It) ∈ (0,1) and c2′
t (It) ∈ (0,Rt+1). Our economy starts at date 0 with
given initial stocks of physical capital, K0, and human capital, H0 . The dynamic
equilibrium describes the time path of factor prices, savings and consumption pro-
ﬁles as well as the evolution of the individual human capital stocks which depend
on the investments in education of the young generations.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the international interest rates (¯ rt) and the initial stocks of




t=1, and a sequence of wages (wt)∞
t=1, such that: At
each date t, t = 1,2,...,
(i) given ¯ rt, Ht−1, and wt, the optimum for each i ∈ Gt in problems (2)-(4) and
(6)-(8) is given by (ci
1,ci
2,si,xi),
(ii) the aggregate stocks of human capital, Ht, satisfy (11),
(iii) the factor prices satisfy wt = FL(Kt/Ht,1) and 1 + ¯ rt = FK(Kt/Ht,1).
6xt(y) depends on Ht−1. For notational convenience, we have chosen not to include Ht−1 as an
argument of the investment function. We shall apply this convention to all behavioral functions
and maintain it when we turn to other ﬁnancing regimes.
10Our comparative dynamics analysis assumes that competitive equilibria (un-
der various regimes) start from the same initial stocks, K0,H0, and compares the
allocations along these dynamic paths period by period. The above deﬁnition of
equilibrium also applies (with minor and obvious modiﬁcation), if the economy
operates under one of the two ﬁnancing schemes outlined below.
2.2 Financing Regime II
Next we analyze the behavior of young individuals when funds needed to ﬁnance
investment in higher education take the form of ‘insured loans’. Assume that the
payback obligation of a loan is linked to an individual’s future (gross) income: agents
with higher incomes (i.e., higher abilities) have higher payback obligations.7 Clearly,
such loan contracts provide insurance against uncertain income prospects which are
due to random ability realizations. We shall consider a risk pooling program of
education loans that includes all young individuals of a given generation and which
requires no subsidization from the government. In particular, by assumption, the
regular credit markets cannot be used for funding educational expenditures. Let
¯ A := E ˜ A =
 
A Aν(A)dA. Furthermore, deﬁne (gross) income of agent i ∈ Gt as
Ii
g := wthi, and let ¯ Ig be the agent’s unconditionally expected income. For each
dollar loaned, agent i in Gt is obliged to pay back RtIi
g/¯ Ig = RtAi/ ¯ A dollars in his
working period, if his income turns out to be Ii
g (and, hence, his ability is Ai). Note
that the repayment per dollar loaned does not depend on the agent’s investment
decision; hence no moral hazard problem arises. Note also that agent i’s expected
payback, Rtxi ¯ Ayi/ ¯ A, is increasing in the signal, i.e., the scheme ‘penalizes’ agents
with high signals.
This ﬁnancing scheme takes no account of the heterogeneity in ability prospects
that is already revealed through the individual signals when investment and bor-
rowing decisions are made. Thus, the scheme does not just provide insurance,
but it rather combines insurance against the unrealized part of ability with cross-
subsidization between classes of people in diﬀerent signal groups.
7An example of income-dependent rate of interest on educational loans exists now at the US
tax code: all interest payments related to student loans are tax deductible!
11Proceeding as in Section 2.1, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimal
























(13) implies that all individuals will invest the same amount, regardless of the signal
they have received, i.e., xi = ˆ xt ∀i ∈ Gt. The investment decision is independent of
the signal because, as the signal changes, the expected marginal gain from invest-
ing changes by exactly the same amount as the expected marginal cost of investing,
thereby eliminating any incentive to adjust the investment level. To see this, ob-
serve that the expected marginal gain from investing is wtg′
1(xi,Ht−1) ¯ Ayi, and the
expected marginal cost of investing is Rt ¯ Ayi/ ¯ A. By (13), the signal does not aﬀect
the diﬀerence between these expressions so that, at the optimum, the incentives to
invest are independent of the signal.
By (13), ˆ xt also depends on Ht−1 and, by our assumptions, it is nondecreasing in
Ht−1.8 Due to the pooling of predictable future income diﬀerences across agents with
diﬀerent signals, coupled with the risk aversion assumption, the optimal investment
in education ˆ xt maximizes the expected lifetime net income prior to the revelation









and, hence, it is independent of y.
This ﬁnding comes as no surprise, because one can think of Regime II as an
insurance scheme from the ex-ante point of view of agents, i.e., prior to any infor-
mation about abilities being revealed. Since ex-ante all agents are identical, the
scheme leads to everyone investing the same amount.
Net income in the working period of an agent in Gt with ability A is given by




8To ease notation we simply write ˆ xt instead of ˆ xt(Ht−1) unless the dependency on Ht−1 is
explicitly needed.
12and the aggregate stock of human capital at date t is
ˆ Ht = ¯ Ag(ˆ xt,Ht−1). (16)




2.3 Financing Regime III
We ﬁnally consider a further class of ‘insured’ loan contracts which specify diﬀerent
terms of repayment for individuals in diﬀerent signal groups. Again, the payback
obligation of a loan is linked to an agent’s future income and, hence, his random
ability, but the implied risk pooling is restricted to individuals in a given signal
group. An agent i in Gt with signal yi who receives a loan to ﬁnance investment
in education xi is obliged to pay back RtxiIi
g/E[˜ Ii
g|yi] = RtxiAi/ ¯ Ayi in his working
period, if his income turns out to be Ii
g (and, hence, his ability is Ai). This program
of education loans allows risk sharing on fair terms within each signal group, but
does not provide risk sharing, or cross-subsidization, among diﬀerent signal groups.9
In particular, an agent’s expected payback does not depend on his signal so that
agents with high signals are not ‘penalized’.
As before, this income-linked loan program does not require any funding from
the government: The agency providing the loans pays a gross interest rate Rt in the





¯ Ayνy(A)dA = Rt.


























According to (18), optimal investment in education of agents in the signal group
Gt(y) depends on the signal only via the term ¯ Ay. We may, therefore, express
9There exist real world examples where private fundings are based on grouping students either
by universities (e.g., at Yale, Harvard, etc.) or by ﬁelds of career. Lleras (2004, p. 66) argues that
such practice is justiﬁed because ‘grouping students by ﬁelds reﬂects similarity in the risks and
the expected returns within the same group’.
13individual investment as ˇ xt
  ¯ Ay
 
. Again, our notation suppresses the dependence
of investment on Ht−1. From (18) we see that ˇ xt
  ¯ Ay
 
maximizes the expected
conditional net income ¯ Aywtg(x,Ht−1) − Rtx.
Since g(x,H) is concave in x and since ¯ Ay is increasing in y (due to MLRP),
equation (18) implies
Lemma 1 Optimal investment in education under Financing Regime III, ˇ xt( ), is
increasing in the signal y, and non-decreasing in Ht−1.
Thus, good news (higher signal) stimulates investment in education. Net income in







ˇ xt( ¯ Ay),Ht−1
 










ˇ xt( ¯ Ay),Ht−1
 
µ(y)dy. (20)
Using (19) in (17), we may write optimal savings as ˇ st
 ˇ It(A, ¯ Ay)
 
.
3 Human Capital Accumulation
In this section we compare the implications of the three ﬁnancing schemes of educa-
tional investment for the equilibrium accumulation of human capital. The ﬁnancing
schemes involve diﬀerent degrees of risk sharing in the economy. It is well known
from the literature that an investor may invest more funds into a risky project, if,
due to eﬀective risk sharing arrangements, he can insure part of the project risk on
easy terms. On the other hand, more eﬀective insurance mechanisms also have the
potential of destroying incentives for some agents to properly invest in education.
The role of the various ﬁnancing schemes for investment in education and human
capital accumulation therefore deserves close scrutiny.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium,10
10The inequalities in (i) and (ii) are strict, if the conditional distribution of ˜ A is non-degenerate
for all signals y.
14(i) each agent chooses higher investment in education under Financing Regime
III compared to Financing Regime I: xt(y) ≤ ˇ xt
  ¯ Ay
 
for all signals y;
(ii) the stock of human capital under Financing Regime III is larger than that
under Financing Regime I: ˇ Ht ≥ Ht for t = 1,2, ...
This result demonstrates the critical role of risk pooling, which is restricted to
signal groups. If such risk pooling takes place on conditionally fair terms, it en-
hances individual investment in education and, thereby, stimulates the formation of
human capital, compared to non-insured funding via credit markets. The intuition
for this ﬁnding is rather straightforward: the fact that under Regime III the agents’
exposure to residual ability uncertainty is reduced through risk pooling leads them
to invest more.11 Note, however, that there is no eﬀort choice in our model. If
income were aﬀected by (unobservable) eﬀort, then ability would no longer be per-
fectly observable through the income variable. In that case, risk pooling even within
signal groups would create a disincentive to work and, consequently, Proposition 1
might no longer hold.
The comparison between Regime II (unconditional risk pooling) and Regime
III (conditional risk pooling) is more intricate. While average investment in edu-
cation may (but need not) be higher under Regime II than under Regime III, the
latter regime always generates higher levels of aggregate human capital. To derive
these results, we introduce the concepts of ‘moderately decreasing concavity’ and
‘strongly decreasing concavity’. Let













K( ) and ˆ K( ) are both (diﬀerent) measures of concavity w.r.t. x for the accumula-
tion function g( ).
11It is worth pointing out, however, that a positive link between reduced uncertainty through
risk pooling and investment activity is not a universal result. Sandmo (1971) showed in a diﬀerent
context that the marginal impact of uncertainty on a ﬁrm’s investment decision, i.e., the eﬀect of
making a given distribution ‘slightly more risky’, is generally ambiguous. The overall eﬀect, by
contrast, which is the diﬀerence between the investment level under uncertainty and the investment
level under certainty, is positive under standard assumptions.
15Deﬁnition 2 Given the restrictions formulated in Assumption 1, the accumulation
function g(x,H) exhibits
(i) moderately decreasing concavity, if ˆ K(x,H) is increasing in x.
(ii) strongly decreasing concavity, if ˆ K(x,H) is decreasing in x.
In order to illustrate these concepts let us focus for a moment on two classes of
accumulation functions to which we will refer occasionally later on. The ﬁrst class is
the family of CRRA functions, and the second class is the family of CARA functions.
Case 1: Let g(x,H) : R2




H , 0 < γ < 1. (21)
Straightforward calculation shows that K′
1(x,H) ≤ 0, ∀x,H, i.e., the accumula-
tion functions exhibit decreasing concavity. Furthermore, ˆ K(x,H) = γxγ−1/H is
strictly decreasing in x, hence, the accumulation function exhibits strongly decreas-
ing concavity.
Case 2: Let g(x,H) belong to the CARA family, i.e.,
g(x,H) = (1 − e
−γx)H, γ > 0. (22)
In this case, ˆ K(x,H) = eγx/H, K(x) = γ and, hence, g(x,H) exhibits moderately
decreasing concavity.
Note that ‘moderately decreasing concavity’ and ‘strongly decreasing concavity’
are mutually exclusive properties. These properties are important because of their
implications for the curvature of the investment function ˇ xt( ):
Lemma 2 The investment function ˇ xt
  ¯ Ay
 
under Regime III is concave (convex)
in ¯ Ay, if g(x,H) exhibits moderately (strongly) decreasing concavity in x.
16Lemma 2 links the curvature of the accumulation function g( ) to the curvature
of the investment function ˇ xt( ). For the purpose of illustration, assume that g( )
exhibits moderately decreasing concavity. Such curvature implies (as compared to
the case of strongly decreasing concavity) that the marginal return to investment
decreases more rapidly. As a consequence, x( ) responds increasingly less sensitive
to higher signals and, therefore, investment is concave.





. For regimes II and III, aggregate investments ˆ Xt and ˇ Xt are deﬁned
analogously.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium,
(i) aggregate investment in education under Regime III is higher than under
Regime II, i.e., ˇ Xt ≥ ˆ Xt for all t, if the accumulation function g(x,H) exhibits
strongly decreasing concavity;
(ii) ˆ Xt ≥ ˇ Xt holds for all t, if g(x,H) is independent of H and exhibits moderately
decreasing concavity.
This result is quite surprising because the better talented agents subsidize the
less talented ones more heavily under Regime II, where all risks are pooled, than
under Regime III, where risks are pooled conditional on the signals. Yet, in the
absence of adverse incentive eﬀects, this sort of cross-subsidization aﬀects the ag-
gregate investment level only through the curvature of ˇ xt( ). If the investment
function is concave (convex) then investment chosen at the average signal – which
is the investment level under Regime II – is higher (lower) than average investment
under Regime III.
According to our next proposition, the ﬁnancing regimes II and III can unam-
biguously be ranked with regard to their impact on human capital formation. Thus,
in view of Proposition 1, higher investment in education is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for higher economic growth.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium aggregate human capital levels under Regime III
are higher than those under Regime II at all dates: ˇ Ht ≥ ˆ Ht, for all t.
17Thus, the Financing Regime III is more eﬃcient than Regime II in terms of gen-
erating economic growth. This result is quite surprising: we do expect, of course,
that the same amount of aggregate investment will translate into more aggregate
human capital under Regime III than under Regime II, because under the former
regime agents use the signal information while under the latter regime the informa-
tion is discarded. Proposition 2 makes the stronger (and less obvious) claim that
this eﬀect always dominates the higher level of aggregate investment which obtains
in Regime II under moderately decreasing concavity of g( ).
The result in Proposition 1 is based on a simple economic mechanism. Since
marginal returns to investment depend on individual abilities, the distribution of
individual investments across agents with diﬀerent abilities aﬀects the formation of
human capital in the economy. In particular, a ﬁnancing regime that encourages
investments of highly talented agents and discourages investments of poorly tal-
ented agents may achieve high levels of aggregate human capital with relatively low
levels of aggregate investment in education. In fact, if g( ) is independent of H, this
happens under moderately decreasing concavity of the accumulation function, when
we switch from Regime II to Regime III. Under Regime II, investment in education
is high but uncorrelated to individual ability. Under Regime III, by contrast, the
better talented agents tend to invest more aggressively than the poorly talented
agents. Since individual investments and abilities are better aligned (and, in this
sense, the transformation of aggregate investment in education into aggregate hu-
man capital is more eﬃcient) under Regime III than under Regime II, aggregate
human capital levels are higher even though the economy as a whole may invest
less in education.
4 Welfare Implications
Our welfare analysis of the various ﬁnancing regimes will be based on an ex-ante
welfare concept. Note that all agents of the same generation are identical ex ante,
i.e., before their signals have realized. We therefore deﬁne economic welfare, Wt, of
generation Gt as the ex-ante expected utility of members of Gt. A ﬁnancing regime
j will be ranked higher than a ﬁnancing regime k (j,k =I,II,III) if all generations
attain higher welfare under Regime j than under Regime k.
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.
Vt(y,Ht−1), the value function for generation Gt, represents the conditional expected
utility of a member of Gt with signal y. Since g(x,Ht−1) is increasing in Ht−1, the
value function is also increasing in Ht−1. The value functions and welfare levels
of generation Gt under regimes II and III, ˆ Vt(y, ˆ Ht−1), ˇ Vt(y, ˇ Ht−1) and ˆ Wt, ˇ Wt, are
deﬁned symmetrically. We say that, e.g., welfare is higher under Regime III than
under Regime II, if ˇ Wt ≥ ˆ Wt holds for all t ≥ 1.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, economic welfare is higher under Regime III than
under Regime I.
Thus, under any political voting process, if it were to be conducted prior to the
revelation of signals, the arrangement of Regime III, which provides conditionally
insured ﬁnancing of private investment in education, will prevail against a regime
of pure credit markets. Regime III leads to higher welfare, because the individuals
beneﬁt from partial risk pooling. This positive impact on welfare is not counteracted
by adverse incentive eﬀects which might result from partial risk sharing: since risks
are only shared within signal groups, the signal risk remains uninsured. Therefore,
the incentive structure remains intact and all agents continue to take their signals
into account when choosing investment in education.
Next we turn to a comparison of economic welfare under regimes II and III.
Under Regime III aggregate human capital is accumulated more eﬃciently because
agents take their signals into account when deciding about investment in education:
agents with good signals who are, on average, better talented invest more than
agents with bad signals. Under Regime II, by contrast, everybody invests the same
amount regardless of the signal. On the other hand, Regime II provides better
pooling of individual income risks than Regime III. To illustrate the interaction
19between economic eﬃciency and risk sharing we specialize our economy by choosing











where γ ∈ (0, 1
2) and 1  = β > 0. Note that the speciﬁcation in (23) implies that g( )
depends only on investment in education, but not on the human capital stock of
the previous generation. The main implication of this simpliﬁcation is that optimal
individual investment in education no longer depends on the human capital stock
of the earlier generation.



























From the last two equations we derive the value function ˇ Vt( ) which satisﬁes
1 − β
Mt




     y












is a positive constant.
Similarly, the value function for Regime II satisﬁes
1 − β
Mt
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Proposition 5 Assume that the utility functions and the human capital formation
function are of the type speciﬁed in (23).
12m represents the saving propensity out of net income, which is constant under the above
speciﬁcation.
20(i) If the measure of relative risk aversion, β, is larger than 1, then economic
welfare under Regime II is higher than under Regime III.
(ii) If β ≤ (1−2γ)/(1−γ), then economic welfare under Regime II is lower than
under Regime III.
In Section 3, we have seen that individual investments and individual abili-
ties are better aligned and, therefore, the allocation of investment in education is
more eﬃcient under Regime III than under Regime II. Nevertheless, according to
Proposition 5(i) all agents may be better oﬀ under Regime II. This result can be
reconciled with economic intuition once we realize that economic welfare depends
not only on the eﬃciency of the human capital accumulation process, but also on
the equilibrium risk allocation. Under Regime II individual ability risks are better
insured, while under Regime III investment is more eﬃciently transformed into hu-
man capital. According to Proposition 5 the former eﬀect is dominant in terms of
economic welfare, if the individuals are highly risk-averse; and the latter eﬀect is
dominant if individuals are moderately risk-averse, i.e., if the measure of relative
risk aversion is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 5 has been derived under the assumption that the capital formation
function g( ) is independent of H. If, under a more general speciﬁcation, g( ) is an
increasing function of H, the welfare comparison between regimes II and III shifts
in favor of Regime III: In view of Proposition 3, aggregate human capital levels are
higher under Regime III than under Regime II. Therefore, since under any regime
the value function of generation Gt is increasing in the human capital stock of Gt−1,
the second part of Proposition 5 remains valid (and can even be strengthened). By
contrast, the ﬁrst part of Proposition 5, which claims that welfare under Regime II
can be higher than welfare under Regime III, may no longer hold, if the previous
generation’s capital stock exerts a strong externality on capital formation in the
current period.
215 Conclusion
The incentives of individuals to invest in higher education are aﬀected by the ﬁ-
nancing scheme under which educational loans are available to them. In this paper
we have analyzed and compared the implications of three diﬀerent funding regimes.
The regimes diﬀer with regard to the terms of repayment of educational loans. In
particular, the extent to which the payback obligations are contingent on the in-
dividuals’ future incomes plays a critical role. While all regimes are self-ﬁnancing,
i.e., they do not require government subsidies, some government intervention is
necessary in order to make the funding mechanisms operative. The ﬁrst regime
works via competitive credit markets. The role of the government is to ensure that
students have unrestricted access to those markets and to enforce debt collection.
The second regime pools the income risks of all agents in the same generation and
treats them equally, i.e, it imposes the same income-dependent payback obligations
on all individuals. This regime cannot be decentralized but must be implemented
by the government. The third regime pools income risks within each signal group
(partial risk pooling). All agents in the same signal group are treated equally, but
individuals with good signals receive loans on more favorable (income-contingent)
terms than agents with bad signals.
We have studied these three ﬁnancing regimes under the assumption that the
same regime applies to all agents. In particular, agents are not free to choose a
repayment scheme that looks most attractive to them. This speciﬁcation constitutes
an important limitation for the generality of our model. Of course, in a more
general setting several ﬁnancing schemes might coexist at the same time so that
in equilibrium agents self-select into diﬀerent groups according to the repayment
schemes they prefer. This possibility is excluded in our analysis and may be the
topic of future research.
We found that aggregate investment in education and human capital stocks are
higher under Regime III compared with Regime I, i.e., partial pooling of income risks
stimulates economic growth. By contrast, unrestricted risk pooling causes eﬃciency
losses: investment in education is more eﬃciently transformed into human capital
under Regime III compared with Regime II. Finally, Regime III leads to higher
welfare than Regime I. And the welfare comparison between regimes II and III
22depends on the individuals’ attitudes towards risk: Regime III generates higher
(lower) welfare than Regime II, if the measure of relative risk aversion is suﬃciently
small (high). This result reﬂects the interaction of two mechanisms resulting from
the fact that income risks are better pooled under Regime II, while the process
which transforms educational investment into human capital is more eﬃcient under
Regime III.
The main purpose of our study was to compare Regime I (competitive credit
markets) with Regime III (partial risk pooling), because these regimes are imple-
mentable in a decentralized setting. Our analysis yields a clear and unambiguous
policy recommendation in favor of Regime III which generates higher growth as
well as higher welfare than Regime I.
Our model also has implications with regard to income inequality under the
various ﬁnancing schemes for higher education. These implications have not been
reported here. Based on a standard concept of income dispersion, it can be shown
that, not surprisingly, Regime II leads to a more egalitarian income distribution
than any of the two other regimes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Under scheme I, individuals have access to loans
provided by the banks at the market interest rates Rt. For each given y and ﬁxed
Ht−1 we have,
Cov
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The covariance in (26) is non-positive, since c1
t(A,y) is increasing in A. From






  ˜ A − Rt













Combining (18) and (27), and making use of the concavity of g(x,H) in x, we
23conclude that xt(y) ≤ ˇ xt
  ¯ Ay
 
.
(ii) The proof is by induction over time periods t = 1,2,   . Since K0,H0
are given at the outset, part (i) implies ˇ H1 ≥ H1. Assume ˇ Ht′ ≥ Ht′ for all
t′ ≤ t. Since, by assumption, g′














ˇ xt+1( ¯ Ay), ˇ Ht
  ¯ Ay =
Rt+1
wt+1 are satisﬁed. Thus,
xt+1(y) ≤ ˇ xt+1
  ¯ Ay
 
holds for each individual in generation Gt+1 with signal y.
Integrating over all signals yields Ht+1 ≤ ˇ Ht+1. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Diﬀerentiating (18), we obtain
∂ˇ xt











ˇ xt( ) is increasing in ¯ Ay according to (18). Therefore, ˇ xt( ) is concave (convex) in
¯ Ay, if g(x,H) exhibits moderately (strongly) decreasing concavity in x. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Since g( ) exhibits strongly decreasing concavity,
ˇ xt( ) is convex in ¯ Ay according to Lemma 2. Then, (13) and (18) imply ˆ xt = ˇ xt( ¯ A).
Proposition 3 claims (and proves independently of this proposition) that ˇ Ht−1 ≥
ˆ Ht−1. Using this fact along with monotonicity of ˇ xt in ˇ Ht−1 and convexity in ¯ Ay,
we conclude
ˇ Xt = E
 
ˇ xt
  ¯ A˜ y, ˇ Ht−1
  
≥ ˇ xt( ¯ A, ˇ Ht−1) ≥ ˇ xt( ¯ A, ˆ Ht−1) = ˆ xt( ˆ Ht−1) = ˆ Xt. (28)
(ii) Under this restriction on the functional form of g( ), ˇ xt( ) is independent of
ˇ Ht−1 and concave in ¯ Ay. The inequality signs in (28) are thus all reversed which
proves the claim. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof consists of two steps.




. In a ﬁrst step we show that ¯ h(z,Ht−1) is





















































By Assumption 1, K′
1( ) is non-positive and, hence, ¯ h( ) is convex in z.
(ii) Now we can prove the claim of the proposition by an induction argument.
Assume ˇ Ht′−1 ≥ ˆ Ht′−1 for t′ ≤ t. We conclude that
ˇ Ht = E
 ¯ h
  ¯ A˜ y, ˇ Ht−1
  
≥ ¯ h( ¯ A, ˇ Ht−1) = ¯ Ag
 
ˇ xt( ¯ A), ˇ Ht−1
 
≥ ¯ Ag(ˆ xt, ˆ Ht−1) = ˆ Ht ,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from step (i), and the second inequality follows
from the induction hypothesis in conjunction with Lemma 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: We show that ˇ Vt(y, ˇ Ht−1) ≥ Vt(y,Ht−1
 
holds for all y
and any ﬁxed t, from which the claim in the proposition follows immediately. From
Proposition 1 we know that ˇ Ht−1 ≥ Ht−1. Therefore, since ˇ V ( ) is increasing in
the second argument, it is suﬃcient to show that ˇ Vt(y,Ht−1) ≥ Vt(y,Ht−1) ∀y is









































       y
 
.






average savings conditional on the signal y, then under Regime III the following˘
-allocation is admissible (but not necessarily optimal):
25˘ xt(y) = xt(y)















































t(A,y) = Rt+1˘ st(A,y)
To complete the proof we show that the ˘-decision leads to higher expected util-
ity conditional on y than the optimal decision under Regime 1. From (29) and (30)
it is immediate that E{˘ c1
t( ˜ A,y)|y} = E{c1











is increasing in A (see equation (5)). Thus, c1
t( ˜ A,y) diﬀers from ˘ c1
t( ˜ A,y)








































preserving spread of ˘ st( ˜ A,y). We have shown that ˇ Vt(y,Ht−1) ≥ Vt(y,Ht−1). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (i) For β > 1,
  ¯ Ay/Rt
 (1−γ)(1−β)/γ is a convex function
of ¯ Ay, which is positively correlated with E
  ˜ A1−β   y
 
. The representations in (24)









































Since (1 − β) is negative, ˇ Wt < ˆ Wt, t ≥ 1, follows.
26(ii) Under this speciﬁcation,
  ¯ Ay/Rt
 (1−γ)(1−β)/γ is again a convex function of
¯ Ay which is positively correlated with E
  ˜ A1−β   y
 
. The same assessment as under
(i) therefore yields ˇ Wt > ˆ Wt since now (1 − β) is positive. ￿
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